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BACKGROUND
Awareness of the potential for finding archaeologicalremains beneath the sea arose in the 1950s and1960s, when self-contained underwater breathing
apparatus (SCUBA) became widely available and
recreational diving became a popular activity. From the
1960s through to the 1980s, the focus of attention was on
shallow coastal waters and many countries introduced
domestic legislation during this period to protect
underwater cultural heritage (UCH) in their territorial
seas. At this time marine archaeology was very much a
nascent discipline. The initial focus was largely on
shipwrecks, and on shipwrecks of some considerable age.
The UK’s Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 was fairly typical
of the type of legislation enacted in this period. It was
designed to protect shipwrecks and the vessels designated
under the Act in its early years were all several hundred
years old. For example, the Tudor warship Mary Rose was
one of the first wrecks afforded designated status under the
Act. Although a substantial part of her hull was recovered
in the early 1980s, a significant amount of material still lies
in the Solent and the site remains protected to this day.
As the discipline of marine archaeology developed and
matured, awareness grew of the potential breadth of
historical remains lying beneath the seas. In the UK it is
now possible to protect a wide variety of archaeological
remains in territorial waters by scheduling them under the
Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (s
53). Ideas about how old something must be to qualify as
being of “historical” or “archaeological” significance have
also changed dramatically in recent years – demonstrated
not least by changing attitudes to the question of whether
or not the Titanic merits protection – and two or three
twentieth century wrecks are now designated under the
Protection of Wrecks Act. Increasingly, education is
recognised as the key to successfully controlling the
activities of recreational divers and amateur souvenir
hunters. Their natural enthusiasm can be harnessed in
many different ways to provide positive benefits for the
UCH. The UK is leading the way in showing how this can
be done, for example through the “Adopt a Wreck” and
“Diving for a Purpose” schemes sponsored by the Nautical
Archaeology Society.
In 1985 the focus of attention shifted dramatically away
from coastal waters. In that year the remains of the Titanic
were discovered, lying at a depth of 2.5 miles and more
than 300 miles off the coast of Newfoundland. Her hull
was split in two and the hull sections were surrounded by
an extensive debris field. The main purpose of the
expedition that found the wreck was to test the capabilities
of a new generation of deepwater exploration vehicle. The
technological advances signalled by the discovery have
resulted in the development of what is today a significant
industry in deepwater salvage. With the aid of modern
hydrographic surveying equipment (in particular, side-scan
sonar, sub-bottom profiling and bathymetric survey) it is
possible to locate wrecks lying on or beneath the ocean
floor fairly easily from surface vessels and virtually all of the
ocean floor, barring the deepest of ocean trenches, is now
accessible using both manned and unmanned
submersibles. As a result, there is now a small – but
extremely well-equipped – band of professional treasure-
hunters who are embarked on a systematic process of
locating and recovering valuable cargoes from shipwrecks.
To use their own term, they are “harvesting” the world’s
oceans of bullion, gold and silver coins, jewellery and
porcelain.
Legal protection of the
underwater cultural heritage:
lessons from the Titanic
by Sarah Dromgoole
The subject of the legal protection of the underwater cultural heritage has a higher profile
today than it has ever had and in many ways this is largely due to the discovery of the
remains of RMS Titanic in 1985 and subsequent developments in respect of that wreck.
The following paper, representing the text of a lecture delivered at the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies in June 2005, charts the history of the subject and considers some
of the lessons that can be learnt from developments in respect of the Titanic. One or two
issues of an ethical nature are also explored.
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While it can cost several million dollars to locate and
recover material, the potential rewards are enormous. For
example, in 2004, gold and silver coins reportedly worth in
the region of $75 million were recovered from the SS
Republic, a Civil-war wreck lying approximately one-third
of a mile deep 100 miles off the coast of Georgia (US).
One of the coins alone (a Liberty Double Eagle) fetched
$66,000 at auction in April 2005. The same organisation
apparently has five high-value “targets” within its sights in
the Western Mediterranean, not to mention a contract
with the UK government for the recovery of coins from
HMS Sussex, a seventeenth century British warship. The
coins on the Sussex alone are reputably worth anywhere
from several hundred million to a billion dollars or more
(for further details of the Sussex contract, see Dromgoole,
2004).
In light of these developments, attention has now shifted
from shallow coastal waters to waters beyond territorial
limits, and from the threat posed by amateur divers to that
posed by professional treasure-hunters. Beyond the 12-
mile limit the situation is governed largely by the
traditional principle of freedom of the high seas and salvage
law. As a result, in many cases there is little to stop treasure
hunters from recovering material and taking it ashore in a
jurisdiction of their choice. Generally speaking, that
jurisdiction is the US. The function of the law of salvage is
both commercial and economic: it is designed to
encourage salvors to recover maritime property and return
it to the “stream of commerce”. Notably, the International
Salvage Convention 1989 does not exclude the UCH from
its scope of application, although it is possible for States to
reserve the right not to apply salvage law to such material
(by virtue of Art 30(1)(d)).
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
foresaw the threat posed by treasure hunting to some
degree and includes two provisions relating specifically to
the UCH, Articles 149 and 303. While these articles are
generally regarded as being entirely inadequate to protect
the UCH, they do have some value. Most significantly,
Article 303(1) imposes an obligation on all 149 States that
are party to the Convention to protect “objects of an
archaeological and historical nature” in all sea areas. It also
requires that they co-operate together for that purpose.
Useful provision is also made for the contiguous zone,
which extends out to 24-miles from coastal baselines (see
Article 303(2)), and somewhat less useful provision is
made for the deep seabed, which the Convention refers to
as the ‘Area’ (see Art 149). There is, however, a “gap” in
the specific provision made by the Convention and that is
in respect of the continental shelf. The Titanic – situated
right at the edge of Canada’s outer continental shelf – falls
in the gap.
One of the positive aspects of the Law of the Sea
Convention is that its provisions appear to leave open the
door to a specific international instrument on the UCH
(see Art 303(4)). An initiative to draft such an instrument,
started by the International Law Association (ILA) in
1990, was given greater impetus by developments in
respect of the Titanic following its discovery. In particular, a
profit-making company called RMS Titanic Inc. (RMST)
had been recovering artefacts from the debris field over a
period of several years and in 1994 was awarded exclusive
salvage rights by a US admiralty court (924 F. Supp. 714).
This focused attention on the inadequacy of international
law, and the Law of the Sea Convention in particular, for
protecting wreck sites beyond territorial limits. The ILA
initiative was therefore taken up – with some sense of
urgency – by UNESCO and in 2001 the UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage was adopted. The Convention is designed to
provide a comprehensive legal regime for regulating the
activities of treasure-hunters in international waters (for
details, see Dromgoole, 2003 (a) and (b)). However, it also
makes some useful provision for territorial waters (Article
7), and for activities that incidentally affect the UCH, such
as mineral exploitation, pipeline and cable-laying, etc.
(Article 5).
The UNESCO Convention enshrines fundamental
archaeological principles, including the prime
archaeological mantra that protection in situ should be the
first option to be considered in determining the future of
a site. Intrusive activity should be permitted only where
scientifically justified, in other words either to advance the
cause of science, or where a site is under some sort of
physical threat. Perhaps most significantly, the Convention
incorporates benchmark standards for archaeological good
practice in Rules set out in an Annex, which are based on
a Charter produced by the International Council for
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) in 1996.
While many would have liked the Convention to exclude
UCH from the law of salvage altogether, it does not
expressly do so (see Art 4), although the practical
implications of its approach mean that salvage law will be
largely irrelevant. Another key question that those drafting
the Convention had to consider was whether or not they
should prohibit commercial exploitation of the UCH and,
in particular, the sale of recovered artefacts. The final text
deals with this issue by effectively banning sale where it will
lead to the irretrievable dispersal of material from a
particular site, but leaving room for the sale of an entire
assemblage, or perhaps significant parts of an assemblage,
to museums or similar institutions (Rule 2 of the Annex).
Unfortunately, the deeply entrenched opposition of the
major maritime States to any extension of coastal State
jurisdiction beyond that established in the Law of the Sea
Convention meant that the drafters at UNESCO were
obliged to resort to very complex mechanisms for
controlling activities beyond the 24-mile contiguous zone.
These measures are heavily dependent for their
effectiveness upon a large number of States participating in
the Convention’s regime and co-operating together
effectively. To a large extent the mechanisms are reliant on18
Amicus Curiae Issue 61 September/October 2005
States Parties exercising jurisdictional rights that they
already possess: in particular the right of a State to govern
the activities of its own nationals and flag vessels, wherever
they might be; and also the right of a State to control the
use of its own territory, including its ports and territorial
waters. Whether the regulatory scheme set out in the
Convention is really workable remains to be seen.
At present, it is difficult to predict what the future of the
Convention will be; indeed, whether it will have a future at
all. Although four years have passed since its adoption by
UNESCO, the ratification process has been painfully slow.
Indeed, to date only five States have ratified: Panama,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Spain and Libya. Nonetheless, 87 States
voted in favour of the adoption of the Convention (with 4
votes against and 15 abstentions) and therefore it seems
likely that the Convention will eventually gain the 20
ratifications required to bring it into force. The really
serious problem the Convention faces is that a number of
key maritime States maintain serious objections to its text
and are unlikely to ratify it in the foreseeable future. These
include: the US, UK, France and Russia. The support of
these States is crucial to the success of the Convention
because their nationals and flag vessels possess the
technology to undertake deepwater salvage. Unless they
participate in the regime, it will leave huge holes in the
Convention’s protective framework.
The UK has expressed two specific objections to the
Convention: one relates to the question of the significance
of the remains that States will be required to protect and
the other relates to the question of sunken warships. As far
as the first objection is concerned, the UK – along with
other common law jurisdictions – has traditionally
identified and designated for protection aspects of the
cultural heritage that are of special significance. This
approach can be seen in its legislation in respect of ancient
monuments and listed buildings, and regulations to control
the export of works of art, as well as the Protection of
Wrecks Act. The latter, for example, affords protection to
wrecks deemed to be of “historical, archaeological or
artistic importance” (emphasis added). The UNESCO
Convention, on the other hand, requires that States protect
“all traces of human existence…which have been…under
water…for at least 100 years”, subject only to those traces
having a cultural, historical or archaeological “character”’. It
therefore adopts what is referred to as a “blanket”
approach (often seen in civil law jurisdictions), protecting
essentially all material – of whatever importance – over a
certain age. The UK government is of the view that it could
not fulfil a duty to protect all such material in light of the
vast number of shipwrecks lying off UK shores. Whether
this is the case or not is debatable, depending at least partly
on exactly what action would be required to fulfil its duties
under the Convention. To some extent this is a matter of
interpretation.
The objection with respect to sunken warships is almost
certainly a much more serious obstacle. The UK and many
other maritime States take the position that their warships
and other State vessels retain sovereign immunity even
after they have sunk. For this reason they argue that they
have exclusive sovereignty over their State vessels wherever
they lie and that no-one may interfere with them without
the express permission of the sovereign flag State. The US
has recently sought to reinforce its position in this respect
by enacting the Sunken Military Craft act of 2004
(formally known as Title XIV of the FY2005 National
Defense Authorization Act), which reiterates its claims in
respect of its sunken State vessels (and aircraft). These
maritime States believe that the provisions of the
UNESCO Convention interfere with their exclusive
sovereignty because in certain circumstances they afford
coastal States the power to determine the future of State
vessels without the agreement of the flag State. A reading
of the relevant provisions of the Convention (Articles 7(3),
10(2), 12(7)) shows that they have a point. Unfortunately,
this essentially technical objection, almost certainly capable
of resolution if there had been more time for negotiation,
is likely to result in a number of important States failing to
ratify the Convention.
LESSONS FROM THE TITANIC
Despite the present uncertainty concerning the future of
the UNESCO Convention, developments in respect of the
Titanic over the last twenty years can teach us some
generally encouraging lessons. The first, and perhaps most
important, lesson that we can learn is that the UNESCO
Convention is already having a significant impact on law
and policy, long before it comes into force or becomes
widely applicable. Moreover, it is having such an impact
even in States that hold specific objections to the
Convention.
In 2000, the US, UK, France and Canada finalised the
text of an inter-State agreement for the protection of the
Titanic (for a detailed analysis of the Agreement, see
Dromgoole, 2006). To date the agreement has been signed
by the US and UK, and it is expected that France and
Canada will follow suit. It will come into force after the US
Congress has passed implementing legislation, which may
take some time. The Agreement is designed to protect the
“exceptional international importance” of the wreck, as
well as its sanctity as a gravesite (Art 2). Inter-State
agreements of this sort have to work within the confines of
existing international law and the Titanic Agreement relies
on existing principles of international jurisdiction to create
a protective regime for the wreck. It provides that States
Parties must regulate the activities of their own flag vessels
and nationals at the site itself, and must also prohibit
activities in their territory, including their ports, territorial
waters, etc., that are inconsistent with the Agreement.
Essentially these are its two “control” devices. If all those
States whose nationals have the technology to access the
site, plus all those States in the general geographical vicinity
of the site, were persuaded to sign the Agreement (which 19
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is the intention of the negotiating parties) these control
devices could be very effective.
What is striking about the Agreement is that it bears a
remarkable degree of similarity to the UNESCO
Convention. The two instruments were drafted at much
the same time and the UNESCO initiative clearly had a
very significant influence on the thinking of those involved
in negotiating the Titanic Agreement. The general
principles and objectives of the UNESCO Convention are
echoed in the Agreement. They include the principle that
the UCH should be preserved for the benefit of humanity
and that States must co-operate to achieve that purpose.
The Titanic Agreement enshrines the principle of
protection in situ, allowing recovery only where
scientifically justified and incorporates Rules in an Annex,
which very closely reflect the Rules in the Annex to the
UNESCO Convention. The policy on commercial
exploitation is also essentially the same, with the sale of
artefacts on the open market effectively prohibited. The
similarity between the two instruments is remarkable given
that three of the four States that negotiated the Titanic
Agreement hold objections to the Convention (the UK, US
and France). Apart from demonstrating that the
Convention is already having an impact, it demonstrates
the degree to which even the maritime States support the
general principles and objectives of the Convention.
Although this may be the most striking example of how
the UNESCO Convention is having an impact, there are
other examples around the world. In particular, a number
of States are considering making use of mechanisms for
protecting sites beyond territorial limits that have some
basis for legitimacy in the Law of the Sea Convention, but
which have been highlighted – and in some cases
developed – by the UNESCO Convention. For example,
Italy and the Netherlands either have, or plan to, extend
their domestic legislation in respect of the UCH to the 24-
mile contiguous zone (see Article 8 of the UNESCO
Convention). In the UK consideration is being given to
affording some form of protection to the UCH indirectly
as a result of measures to protect the country’s sovereign
natural resources on its continental shelf (see Art 10(2) of
the UNESCO Convention). It is possible that the Marine
Bill, which is part of the government’s forthcoming
legislative programme, will make provision in this respect.
Whatever the fate of the Convention, it seems likely that its
general principles, and the Rules in its Annex, will be
applied increasingly in domestic legislation and
international agreements of various sorts, so that eventually
they become a global standard. This in itself would be no
mean achievement.
The Titanic Agreement is itself an example of one of the
mechanisms that the UNESCO Convention highlights –
and encourages States to use – to provide protection for
the UCH. Article 6 of the Convention encourages States to
enter into bilateral, regional or other multilateral
agreements, or to develop existing agreements, for the
“preservation of UCH”, the idea being that in certain
circumstances such agreements may afford more effective
protection than the Convention itself. The Titanic
Agreement demonstrates that some major maritime States
are prepared to utilise this mechanism. In fact, since the
late 1980s both the US and the UK have negotiated a
number of such agreements in order to protect historically
significant wreck sites. Generally speaking these
agreements have been used to avert a potential
jurisdictional conflict in circumstances where a sunken
warship or other State vessel of one State has been
discovered in the territorial waters of another. The most
recent example is the agreement of 2003 between France
and the US for the protection of de Salle’s vessel, La Belle,
which sank off Texas in 1686. The Titanic Agreement is
unusual in that it relates to a site in international waters. In
such cases a plurilateral -rather than a bilateral –
agreement will usually be required.
Agreements for the protection of specific wreck sites are
usually made after a site has been discovered and may not
‘bite’ until serious interference has taken place. This is
graphically illustrated in the case of the Titanic. Despite its
depth, in the two decades since its discovery numerous
expeditions to the site have taken place for the purpose of
recovering artefacts, providing public tours, taking film and
photographs and conducting scientific experiments.
During this time, more than 6,000 artefacts have been
removed from the debris field and significant features of
the ship have disappeared or collapsed. The manoeuvring
of submersibles has also had a visible impact on the hull
sections. After Robert Ballard, joint-leader of the
expedition that found the wreck, returned to the site in
2004, he reportedly said that it had been ‘irreversibly
damaged’ (Washington Post, 19 June 2004). Arguably,
therefore, the agreement for the protection of the site
comes far too late in the day.
Nonetheless, inter-State agreements have the potential
to be used on a much broader scale than to date and to take
effect at a much earlier point in time, in other words before
sites are discovered. Article 6 of the UNESCO Convention
specifically refers to the possibility of regional agreements,
whereby all the States in a particular region agree to
control the activities of their own nationals, and the use of
their territory, in respect of any activities in the region.
Such agreements could be particularly effective in enclosed
and semi-enclosed sea regions, such as the Mediterranean,
the Baltic and perhaps even in the East and South East
China Seas. A further possibility would be for two States to
negotiate a bilateral agreement whereby each agrees to
control inappropriate activities by its own nationals or in
its own waters in respect of the sunken warships and State
vessels of the other. In light of their common perspective
on such matters, such an agreement would seem an
obvious route for the US and UK to pursue. Although the
US has been promoting inter-State agreements as an
alternative to the UNESCO Convention, such agreements20
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should not be seen as a threat to the Convention. Provided
they adopt the same principles and standards, they can
operate alongside the Convention and have the potential to
be an extremely useful and flexible device.
A further lesson that we can learn from the recent
history of the Titanic is that the law of salvage, at least as
applied in the US, is gradually reforming itself to perform
a cultural – as well as commercial and economic –
function. In light of the fact that the US is the jurisdiction
of choice for many treasure hunters, the development of
US judicial thinking on this topic is of crucial significance.
Since 1994, a US District Court in Norfolk, Virginia,
overseen by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has
presided over an extraordinary in rem action in respect of
the Titanic. Over the eleven-year period that the action has
been on-going, there have been numerous district court
hearings, along with two by the Court of Appeals. The
reports make fascinating reading.
As mentioned earlier, in 1994 the district court awarded
RMST exclusive salvage rights, in other words conferred
upon it the status of “salvor-in-possession”. In order to
maintain this status, RMST has mounted regular
expeditions to the site and recovered thousands of
artefacts. It has also been required to submit periodic
reports of is activities to the district court in order to
demonstrate that it is undertaking the salvage with due
diligence. In return, the court has protected the exclusivity
of RMST’s rights by issuing injunctions against the
activities of competing salvors (924 F Supp 714, 1996 WL
650135, 9 F Supp 2d 624). Since the Titanic lies in
international waters, outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the US admiralty court, in order to exercise jurisdiction
over the site the court asserted “constructive in rem”
jurisdiction. It did this on the basis that – although the
wreck itself was not within its jurisdiction – part of the
wreck (a wine decanter) had been brought within the
jurisdiction. This basis for jurisdiction was both confirmed,
and extensively discussed, by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals (RMS Titanic Inc v Haver, 1999). Of course, the
extra-territorial location of the wreck means that any
injunctions issued by the court are effective only against US
nationals and flag vessels, not against the “whole world”.
A significant factor that the district court has taken into
account, both in granting RMST exclusive rights and in
subsequently protecting those rights, has been that the
organisation from the outset manifested an intention not
to sell any artefacts raised, but instead to keep the artefacts
together as a collection for exhibition to a paying public.
Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals have recognised that there is a public interest in
maintaining the archaeological integrity of such a unique
historical wreck and believe that such interest is served by
ensuring that the artefacts are properly conserved and kept
together as a publicly accessible collection. Although it
appears that in recent years RMST has found it difficult to
fund the huge costs of its deepwater salvage work solely by
exhibition revenues, it has been precluded by court order
from selling individual artefacts (with the exception of
pieces of coal) (286 F.3d 194).
In the last year or so, it seems that RMST has been keen
to obtain at least an interim salvage award, but the district
court appears to have been equally keen to postpone
making such an award because it fears it will lose control of
the artefacts if it does so. To all intents and purposes, the
district court has been managing activities on the site and
determining the disposition of material recovered from the
site. It would argue that it has prevented free-for-all looting
of the site, ensured that the artefacts are carefully
recovered and properly conserved, and that they are kept
together and made available for public exhibition.
While the unique public interest in the Titanic has
certainly been a factor in the attitude and approach of the
US federal courts in this particular case, the principles they
have developed and expounded over the years will
undoubtedly be applied in future cases. In fact, it is not
only in the case of the Titanic that archaeological
considerations have already been taken into account.
Litigation in respect of the Central America in the early
1990s (see 974 F.2d 450) led to recognition of efforts
taken by a salvor to preserve the archaeological
“provenance” of material as a seventh factor to be taken
into account in determining the level of a salvage award
(the six traditional factors having been established by the
Supreme Court in The Blackwall, 1870).
It is clear then that salvage law, at least as applied in the
US, is gradually being modified to take into account
archaeological considerations. Nonetheless, salvage law –
however “modified” – will always be flawed in its
application to UCH. This is because the fundamental
purpose of salvage law – to encourage recovery – is
antithetical to the foremost archaeological principle of
protection in situ. Furthermore, the judiciary’s control
over a site will only begin after material has been recovered
and brought ashore. From an archaeological point of view,
any interference with a site is destructive: as the
archaeological mantra goes, “excavation equals
destruction” (and this includes proper archaeological
excavation). What is required is a system whereby
management decisions can be made before any interference
takes place. Furthermore, the decisions should be taken by
executive agencies with professional archaeological
expertise, rather than by judges, however well-meaning.
The purpose of the UNESCO Convention is to introduce
such a system. Nonetheless, until such time as the
Convention becomes widely applicable (which may be
many years), the process of modifying salvage law will be of
crucial significance.
The late Mr. Geoffrey Brice QC put forward the
suggestion that there should be an archaeological protocol
to the International Salvage Convention, making special
provision for the application of salvage law to maritime 21
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cultural property (Brice, 1996). If at some point in the
future the UNESCO Convention appears to be a dead
letter, this proposal would undoubtedly be worth pursuing.
ETHICAL MATTERS
In considering how best to regulate interference with
the UCH, several questions of an ethical nature need to be
addressed. While the Titanic probably does not teach us any
particular lessons about them, it does provide us with a
fairly unique illustration of the issues and demonstrates the
complexities that may arise in framing legal instruments in
this field.
One of the questions facing the drafters of the UNESCO
Convention was whether they should allow some room for
commercial participation in the scheme they were creating.
In other words, should commercial operators be
recognised as legitimate “users” of the underwater cultural
“resource” (as is the case, for example, in the US
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987)? As mentioned earlier,
the drafters concluded that commercial exploitation – in
so far as it involved the sale of artefacts on the open market
– was unacceptable, since it would lead to the irretrievable
dispersal of material. However, the Convention does not
outlaw other forms of commercial exploitation.
Since its discovery, the Titanic has been the subject of
commercial exploitation in forms never previously seen.
This is partly because of the fame of the wreck and partly
because (unlike most other wrecks that have been targeted
by commercial operators) the Titanic is not a treasure ship.
Generally speaking, neither her cargo, nor the personal
possessions of passengers and crew, had any great intrinsic
value. The Cargo Manifest, for example, shows that she was
carrying a remarkable range of largely perishable general
cargo, mainly comprising all sorts of foodstuffs, clothing
materials and other types of household goods and
consumables. While the sale of the many thousands of
mundane artefacts recovered from the site would
undoubtedly raise a considerable sum of money because of
the premium that the Titanic “legend” places on them, it
seems that the salvor, RMST, calculated that even more
money could be earned by creating a permanent collection
of artefacts available for public exhibition. The recovery of
artefacts for exhibition has therefore been the main form
of commercial exploitation of the site. However, since the
exclusivity of RMST’s salvage rights does not extend to
merely visiting the site, filming it, or taking photographs
(RMS Titanic Inc v Haver, 1999), other commercial
operators have also been exploiting the site, in particular,
by conducting public tours (the price of a “luxury” tour,
including a 12-hour “adventure dive” in a submersible is in
the region $36,000).
An interesting feature of the Titanic Agreement is that it
seeks to regulate only entry into the hull sections of the
vessel and activities “aimed at” the artefacts in the debris
field. This means that merely visiting the site on a “look but
don’t touch” basis will not require authorisation. On the
face of it, this may seem reasonable enough. However,
when activities are motivated by profit, there is always a
risk that they may result – intentionally or unintentionally
– in intrusive interference. As circumstances in respect of
the Titanic illustrate, even tour operators and film-makers
may inadvertently cause physical damage simply by
attempting to get as close as possible to the site to obtain
the best view, or camera shots.
The reason for the absence of any regulation of these
activities in the Agreement is that one of its main
underlying policies is the promotion of public access.
While some “purist” archaeologists would argue that any
form of commercial exploitation of UCH is unacceptable
because of the potential damage it might cause, there is no
doubt that commercially funded activities can open up sites
(especially deepwater sites) to the general public in ways
that few publicly funded organisations could afford.
Nonetheless, surely they require some form of regulation?
Under the terms of the UNESCO Convention, for
example, such activities would almost certainly have to be
licensed, and conditions could thereby be imposed upon
them. The fact that the Titanic Agreement does not
provide for this is surprising.
A further issue arises from the question of public access.
To what extent, if at all, should such access be permitted
where a vessel sank with loss of life, especially in relatively
recent times? More than 1,500 passengers and crew lost
their lives when the Titanic sank in 1912. Close relatives of
the victims will certainly still be living. There is some
considerable tension in the Titanic Agreement between its
two aims: to protect the sanctity of the site as a maritime
memorial and to safeguard the public interest in the site as
one of exceptional international significance. In practice,
these two interests are extremely difficult to reconcile. For
this reason, the protective scheme set out in the Agreement
incorporates a fundamental compromise. On the basis that
if there are any human remains on the site, they are likely
to be found in the hull (where many people were trapped)
recovery of artefacts from within the hull is precluded even
though there is archaeological (and, no doubt, public)
interest in such recovery. The debris field, on the other
hand (where no human remains have been found to date)
will be open to exploitation, subject to appropriate
recovery methodology and disposition of artefacts.
Whether this scheme draws an appropriate balance
between public interest and the sanctity of the site must be
questionable. In particular, it seems surprising that any
entry to the hull is permissible. Surely even entry to film
the interiors invades the sanctity of what is after all a mass
grave, whether or not human remains are actually found?
Furthermore, one might also question whether the
recovery of artefacts from the debris field should be
permissible. Some of those artefacts will be the personal
possessions of people who died in the disaster, possibly
even items that they were wearing at the time of their22
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death. The UNESCO Convention provides that any
activities must avoid the “unnecessary disturbance of
human remains or venerated sites” (Rule 5 of the Annex).
Arguably, the Titanic Agreement does not provide for this.
While the sinking of the Titanic is the most famous
maritime disaster, there are plenty of other cases where
there has been great loss of life at sea, especially as a result
of war. Lying off the coast of Jutland in Denmark are a
number of British and German vessels that were lost in the
Battle of Jutland in World War I, with many thousands of
sailors on board. Several of these wrecks were located in
2000 and 2001, and are now the subject of attention from
Danish and other divers. There are also two or three
German vessels lying in Gdansk Bay in Poland, which were
lost towards the end of World War II carrying several
thousand refugees from German East Prussia along with all
their valuables. In recent years these too have attracted the
attention of divers. In both cases there is currently no legal
protection for the sites, presumably because of various
political sensitivities and uncertainty about the question of
jurisdiction. In cases such as these, inter-State agreements
may well be the best way forward. However, the balancing
of public interest in access and the preservation of the
sanctity of the site will need to be addressed on a case-by-
case basis. Arguably, the more recent the disaster, the less
justification there is for public access. In the case of the
passenger ferry Estonia, which sank in 1994 with the loss of
approximately 800 lives, there is an inter-State agreement
that seeks to criminalise any activities disturbing the peace
of the site.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are some that argue that the Titanic has been
diverting attention and resources from other far more
important underwater historical sites. While there may be
some truth in this, the argument ignores the fact that the
wreck is a major, relatively recent, gravesite. For this reason
alone the author believes that the site merits legal
protection. However, whatever one’s views about this,
there is no doubt that the discovery of the Titanic in 1985
and subsequent developments in respect of the wreck have
focused international attention on the subject of the legal
protection of the UCH in a way that no other shipwreck
could. Furthermore, they have taught us some very
valuable lessons.
International instruments
Agreement between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic
of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden regarding the
M/S Estonia, 1995
Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the French
Republic regarding the Wreck of La Belle (Washington,
31 March 2003)
Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS
Titanic (see Appendix to DTp Consultation on UK
Implementation of the Agreement for the protection of
the wreck of the RMS Titanic, 7 April 2003
(http://www.dft.gov.uk))
ICOMOS Charter on the Protection and Management of
Underwater Cultural Heritage (1996)
International Salvage Convention 1989
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the
Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001
UK statute law and statutory instruments
Protection of Wrecks Act 1973
Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979
Protection of Wrecks (M/S Estonia) Order 1999 (SI 1999,
No. 856)
Protection of Wrecks (RMS Titanic) Order (SI 2003, No.
2496) (not yet in force)
US statute law
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
Sunken Military Craft act of 2004 (otherwise known as
Title XIV of the FY2005 National Defence
Authorization Act (Public Law No. 108–375, Oct. 28,
2004))
US caselaw
The Blackwall 77 US 10 Wall. 1 (1870)
Columbus America Discovery Group v The Unidentified, Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel (The Central America) 974 F.2d
450 (1992)
RMS Titanic Inc v Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 F.
Supp. 714 (ED Va May 10, 1996)
RMS Titanic Inc v Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 1996 WL
650135 (ED Va, 1996)
RMS Titanic Inc v Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 9 F Supp
2d 624 (ED Va, 1998)
RMS Titanic Inc v Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. (Va.)
March 24, 1999)
RMS Titanic Inc v Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 286 F.3d
194 (4th Cir. (Va.) April 12, 2002)
RMS Titanic Inc v Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 323 F.
Supp.2d 724 (ED Va Jul 02, 2004)
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